The present article argues that the Doing Business indicators, their legitimacy (their ability to be defended through some logic or justification arising from standards), and the wider notions of legitimacy (the standards) that they promulgate are all best understood as social, or better still, ÔeconosociolegalÕ constructions. It tracks their, primarily post-financial crisis, re-co-construction within and beyond the World Bank from servant of the private sector and discipliner of states, to something approaching social champion. But it warns that the perceptions of legitimacy that have been generated by those indicators may well linger.
Introduction
This article starts from the interrelated premises that (a) legitimacy and standards are mutually constitutive (b) legitimacy and standards are co-constructed through social actions, interactions and regimes, in the context of prevailing rationalities and (c) coconstructions are necessarily provisional and contingent, and therefore subject to reco-construction, in particular as rationalities shift. It explores the validity and implications of these premises through one set of standards, the Doing Business indicators, which have been produced and distributed by the World Bank since 2004 to measure the roles played by state legal systems in business life around world, with special reference to the implications for economic development Legitimacy, as commonly defined, is constructed with reference to rules/standardsÑ specifically (a) compliance with rules/standards or (b) the ability to be defended through some logic or justification arising from rules/standards. Socio-legal specialists are particularly well-versed in exposing the sociallyconstructed and, therefore, contingent and provisional nature of all standards, of their implementation, and of their legitimacy. Sociologically-informed approaches seek to Ôconsistently and permanently address[es] the need to reinterpret law systematically and empirically as a social phenomenonÕ (Cotterrell 1998, p. 183 ). So we users of such approaches are ever-attuned to the facts that inside every standard there lurks a debate, and that any standard can be abused or avoided. So well do we know these facts about the social life of standards, that we risk taking them for granted, forgetting their origin, becoming blasŽ as to their enduring significance.
Indeed, it is instructive to remember that there remain all manner of standards by which sociolegal specialists remain blindly persuaded, of whose social life we remain entirely ignorant. For example, a recent object-based enquiry caused me to notice the quietly forceful rule/standard commonly engraved on, materially embedded in, metallic measuring devices (in this case, a caliper): ÔSTANDARD at 20¼Õ. Further investigation revealed that this international standard reference temperature for dimensional measurements was established after fierce debate at a time when the temperature scale was itself Ôunder serious studyÕ (Dorion 2007 pp. 2-3. See also Perry-Kessaris 2016) . The setting of this as the standard had a radical, on-going effect on the physical sciences that rarely-to-never crosses most minds (Figure 1 ).
Furthermore, as the bent caliper pin pictured in Figure 1 reminds us, even agreed physical standards are always subject to abuse and avoidance.
All of this is to say that, repetitive though they may sometimes feel, exposŽs of the social life of rules/standards, in particular of the intertwined stories of their legitimacy and re-co-construction, remain a crucial sociolegal enterprise.
[ Figure 1 : The contingency of standards about here]
The present article argues that the Doing Business indicators, their legitimacy (their ability to be defended through some logic or justification arising from standards), and the wider notions of legitimacy (the standards) that they promulgate are all best understood as social, or better still, ÔeconosociolegalÕ constructions. I use this ungainly term to highlight the facts that Ôthe economy and the law are mutually constitutive, and that both are in turn mutually constitutive of wider social life, including that part of social life relating to how we think and communicate aboutÕ the economic and the legal (Perry-Kessaris 2015 and 2014 ).
This entanglement is especially significant given that the Doing Business indicators are produced and consumed in a development assistance context which sees people Ôover hereÕ defining how people Ôover thereÕ ought to think and communicate about the economic and the legal. Because indicators are socially constructed they are contingent and provisional, and therefore stand to be re-evaluated and re-constructed.
But as a technology of governance they are subject to narrow control and vested interests.
This article shows the legitimacy of the Doing Business indicators and the legitimacy that they seek to confer on state legal systems have been intensely contested, resulting in their on-going re-co-construction.
Construction
An indicator is a named collection of rank ordered data that purports to represent the past or projected performance of some aspect of social (including economic and legal) life. It is useful to visualise the construction of indicators, and their legitimacy, as occurring in four stages, each of which is visualised in Figure 2 When we construct an indicator, we scan social life to identify traces of the actions and interactions that appear, in the context of our specific rationality, to be important. number of steps) relating to specific (inter)actions of/between commercial actors and judges or bureaucrats. Next the grouped traces are converted, through economic, mathematical and governance regimes, into named indicators. Finally, the indicator is ready to be communicated within the inward and outward facing regimes or systems of the producer and then beyond as it is distributed to and consumed by, others. For example, the Doing Business indicators are produced and consumed by the World Bank, which then also distributes them for consumption by states, commentators and commercial actors.
Legitimacy through indicators
Once in circulation, indicators offer a standard against which to measure legal systems. For example the Doing Business indicators are aggregated into an Ôease of doing business indexÕ which ranks states and regions within them, thereby constructing the statesÕ international reputation and, thereby, the terms on which it accesses technical and financial development assistance, which in turn triggers annual ministerial handwringing across the globe. In addition to the more active roles that it plays in stimulating competition and directing conditional funding, a legal system indicator also acts as a placeholder. A placeholder is Ôa technique for working with and in the meantimeÕÑfor pragmatic and other reasons (Riles 2011, pp. 173) . It fulfils the human need to set our awareness of contingency and provisionality to the side. The indicator functions as a placeholder for underlying, provisional and contingent, aspects of real social (including economic) life. Its form, whether presented raw as digits or visualised in a chart, is akin to a snapshot. So it is that many of Susan SontagÕs (1977) To some extent the very generation of a snapshot/indicator itself confirms the significance, perhaps as a source of legitimacy, of the thing that is being captured by it. As Sontag put it, Ôan event has come to mean, precisely, something worth photographingÕ (1977 p. 18) . So there is a degree of self-referential circularity to the 4 These are often, erroneously, seen as being best when they are motivated purely by purpose, the task at hand. report included a section entitled Ôideas behind the indicatorsÕ. As these ideas or rationalities change, the circle of legitimacy is broken and the indicators come under pressure. Throughout the process of co-construction the rationalities that underpin an indicator, and therefore it legitimacy, as well as the legitimacy that it seeks to confer, may be aligned or at odds with other rationalities.
Legitimacy of indicators
The Doing Business indicators can be seen as part of a wider ÔcampaignÕ, the purpose of which has been to benchmark national and sub-national Ôinvestment climatesÕ, setting development standards in and through the process . That campaign has been driven by a yet broader phenomenon which Fine and
Milonakis have termed Ôeconomics imperialismÕ (2008). So the Doing Business
regime marketizes national legal systems, treating them Ôas ifÕ they were (solely)
Ôcommodities competing for the attentions of foreign investorsÕ; and seeks to numericise legal systems to render them accessible to mathematization, the analytical method of choice for mainstream economics (Perry-Kessaris 2011 p. 417).
Although the Doing Business regime affects all of social (including economic and legal) life, it constructs legitimacy in and through the rationalities and regimes of ÔorthodoxÕ or ÔmainstreamÕ economics. This is troubling because economics--Ôthe only social science that remains almost entirely impenetrable to those who have not undertaken the requisite apprenticeship in graduate schoolÕ (Rodrik 2015, p. 31) .
The dominance of economics is methodologically contentious because it is closed to non-specialists, including lawyers. The Doing Business indicators are often praised and given legitimacy on the basis of their methodological transparency (IEG 2008 (IEG p. xvi, 2015 (IEG overview, 2016 . But that transparency is only as valuable as the scrutiny it facilitates. It is likely that the quantitative and econo-centric focus of the indicators exclude potential critics from investigating. Furthermore, and perhaps never more than in 2016, there may be more fun and splash to be had from working with data sources than from questioning them.
The dominance of economics is normatively contentious because economics has in recent decades been exceptionally narrow, offering universal prescriptions centering on stabilization, privatization and liberalization, especially in the context of development assistance (Rodrik 2015, 167) .
It is useful to consider these two strands of contention in the context of Max WeberÕs typology of rationalities: pragmatic, value-based, theoretical and rule-based. 5 Of less immediate relevance in the present context are pragmatic rationalities, which guide expediency, and value-based rationalities, which guide taste and morality. Indicators tend instead to be a function of theoretical and formal rationalities, the former exerting a heavy influence on the latter which is often under acknowledged especially in the pseudo-neutral context of development assistance.
Theoretical rationalities are grounded in Ôa conscious mastery of reality through the construction of increasingly precise and abstract conceptsÕ (Kalberg 1980 (Kalberg , p. 1152 . 
Re-co-construction
The legitimacy of the Doing Business indicators has also been subjected to three rounds of intensive, formal scrutiny from within the World Bank: the Independent Evaluation Group Report (2008) Overtime the focus of these challenges has shifted between two interconnected threads. The methodological thread, grounded in formal rationalities off science, of how to measure Ôease of doing businessÕ in a development context, has increasingly given way to a normative thread, grounded in theoretical rationalities, of why one ought to do so.
Scientific legitimacy
The first formal institutional challenge to the Doing Business regime came from the Independent Evaluation Group ( The IEG suggested that the Doing Business indicators have been Ôhighly effective in drawing attention to the burdens of business regulationÕ (IEG 2008, p. xv) . But that achievement in communication is best read as a failure, because their legitimacy was found to be weak: they are measuring the wrong things, badly. The report noted a lack of methodological transparency; a reliance on thin data sets; an ideological bias in data selection; and a failure to monitor the impact of indicators with a view to making any necessary adjustments--what we might call Ôre-scanningÕ (IEG 2008, p. xiii) . So the Doing Business regime Ôidentifies countries as reformersÕÑas placeholders for what it means to be successfulÑÔbased on changes in country rankings, without regard to the relevance and quality of the reformÕ; or to whether those reforms have actually implemented (IEG 2008, p. 45 and 46) . Nor is there a Ôclear articulation of the impactÕ of the reforms measured by the Doing Business regime Ôon firm performance, perceptions of regulatory burden, or the overall regulatory environment in a countryÕ (IEG 2008 p. 46) . ÔDifferent contextsÑdifferent markets, social settings, countries, time periods, and so onÑrequire different modelsÕ (Rodrik 2015 p. 11) . Consequently, when models are selected judiciously, they are a source of illumination. When used dogmatically, they lead to hubris and errors in policyÕ (Rodrik 2015, p. 11) . All of this is no Ôalmost a mantra for development economists, finance experts and international agenciesÕ who chant that Ôno single set of policies is appropriate for all countriesÕ, so that Ôreforms must be tailored to specific circumstancesÕ. In this new context legitimacy comes not from following the standard but rather from choosing an appropriate standard for the circumstances (Rodrik 2015, p. 167) .
But the universalizing ranking system of the Doing Business regime works directly against the philosophy of context-specificity. It embosses both the standard (a legal system that has X features is ÔgoodÕ, and therefore legitimate) and the outcome (this country A is good/legitimate).
Once we have seen this format of legitimacy/tion, we cannot un-see it. And every effort is made to see that we do see it. IndicatorsÑfrom World Development remember. However, they often make the indicators sound more comprehensive than they are, given their well-defined (and therefore limited) scope of measurementÕ (IP 2013, p. 30) .
Conclusion
Even in the most concrete, physical, of spheres, the history of measurement is one of Governance indicators are not new and they did not start with the World Bank. The
Bank was applauding (and later supporting) NGOs for issuing score cards ranking public services in Bengaluru and Pune as early as the mid 1990s (Perry 1998) . What has changed is that they are being issued and responded to daily, and by the city 
